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INTRODUCTION
The importance of tackling financial crime was
illustrated during the 1980s and 1990s by US-
led ‘war on drugs’ and the ‘financial war on
terrorism’ in 2001. We have witnessed signifi-
cant instances of fraud involving multinational
corporations resulting in the collapse of the
Bank of Credit Commerce International,
Barings Bank, Enron and WorldCom. More
recent instances of fraud include Jerome
Kerivel, who made illegal transactions that cost
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale £3.7 billion.1 In 2009, Bernard
Madoff was sentenced to 150 years imprison-
ment after being found guilty of architecting a
pyramid fraud worth approximately £40
billion.2 The impact and scale of these scandals
have been overshadowed by a new threat to the
financial markets in the United States and
the United Kingdom – mortgage fraud. The
Association of Chief Police Officers claim that
the annual level of mortgage fraud in the
United Kingdom is approximately £700
million per year.3 However, in the United
States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
citing research by the Prieston Group, con-
cluded that the annual level of mortgage fraud is
between $4 to $6 billion.4 Therefore, it is
essential that the United Kingdom creates and
implements a robust financial crime policy.
But what is financial crime? According to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘there is
no internationally accepted definition of finan-
cial crime’.5 A useful point of reference is
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(FSMA 2000). According to s.6(3), financial
crime is defined as ‘any offence involving
fraud or dishonesty; misconduct in, or misuse
of information relating to, a financial market; or
handling the proceeds of crime’.6 However, this
definition does not specifically refer to either
money laundering or the financing of terrorism,
both of which are associated with other types of
financial crime including fraud (p. 8).5 Financial
crime is mistakenly referred to as a ‘victimless
crime’, and in many instances it is impossible to
identify who or what has suffered a financial
loss. If this statement is to be believed, why do
so many governments dedicate resources and
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time to limit the extent and impact of financial
crime? The answer to this question could be
found in the following quotation from the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘criminal
proceeds have the power to corrupt and
ultimately destabilise communities or whole
national economies’.7 Financial crime is attrib-
uted to organised criminals who seek to
maximise their profits so that they can enjoy a
so-called ‘champagne lifestyle’.8 Furthermore,
financial crime can erode the integrity of a
nation’s financial institutions. The IMF stated
that ‘negative consequences for a country’s
macroeconomic performance, impose welfare
losses, and may also have negative cross border
negative externalities’ (p. 8).5 Vaithilingam and
Nair stated that ‘financial-related crimes have
significant economic and social consequences
for nations worldwide. It weakens the financial
systems which are the main players for global
financial transactions’.9 It is also a threat to
national security.10 For example, terrorists
need money and resources to carry out their
activities. Although much of the finance for
terrorism comes from legitimate sources, a large
percentage will come from criminal activity; a
good example of this is the terrorist attacks of
September 2001 where some of the finances
were obtained from credit card fraud and
identity theft.11 Since these terrorist attacks,
there has been an increased focus on cutting off
the financial resources of terrorism; however,
this is proving extremely difficult and contro-
versial. What is the cost of financial crime?
According to the FATF:
UK law enforcement estimates the eco-
nomic and social costs of serious orga-
nised crime, including the costs of
combating it, at upwards of £20 billion
a year. It is estimated that the total
quantified organised crime market in the
UK is worth about £15 billion per year
as follows: drugs (50 per cent); excise
fraud (25 per cent); fraud (12 per cent);
counterfeiting (7 per cent); organised
immigration crime (6 per cent).12
HM Treasury noted that ‘organised crime
generates over £20 billion of social and
economic harm in the UK each year’ (p. 6).13
The Home Office stated that organised crime
‘reaches into every community, ruining lives,
driving other crime and instilling fear’.14
Furthermore, financial crime has an adverse
impact on the economies of countries. For
example, Scanlan noted the economic impact of
terrorism and stated that ‘the disruption to the
transport system in London caused by the bomb
attacks of 7 and 21 July 2005 alone have been
estimated to have cost the nation in excess of
£3 billion’.15 Similarly, the Bishopsgate bomb-
ing in London in 1993 caused damage to
property in excess of £1 billion.16 Therefore,
this article identifies and comments on the
policies adopted towards money laundering,
fraud and the financing of terrorism.
MONEY LAUNDERING
The UK’s anti-money laundering (AML) policy
has been led by HM Treasury, a point illustrated
by the publication of its ‘Anti-money launder-
ing strategy’.17 However, there are other actors
who play an important role in the UK’s AML
policy including the Financial Services Author-
ity (FSA), the Joint Money Laundering Steering
Group ( JMLSG) and the Serious Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA). In its policy docu-
ment, HM Treasury stated that its strategy
was based on three objectives – effectiveness,
proportionality and engagement (p. 12).17 In
terms of the first objective, HM Treasury took
the view that the United Kingdom would
continue to ensure that it preserves an effective
AML scheme so that it achieves its international
obligations (p. 7).17 This is achieved by a series
of domestic measures including the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002 (PCA 2002), the MLR 2007,
professional guidance issues by the JMLSG and
specific AML rules issued by the FSA. These
measures also seek to achieve the international
standards set by the 40 Recommendations
of the FATF, the obligations imposed on
the United Kingdom by the Third Money
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Laundering Directive and those contained in
the Vienna and Palermo Conventions. The
second objective, proportionality, means that
the government will continue to adopt a risk-
based approach towards money laundering.
This seeks to ensure that its AML measures
are cost effective so that firms can adopt a
flexible approach towards meeting their obliga-
tions.18 The final objective, engagement,
provides that the authorities will continue to
work with firms to ensure that the consultation
process is fully utilised and that the levels
of feedback regarding the performance of
the regulated sector is communicated to them
(p. 7).17 HM Treasury outlined how it aims to
achieve these objectives ‘the existing regime
consists of measures ranging from provisions in
the criminal law [authors emphasis] to punish
money launderers and to deprive them of their
proceeds, to the obligation on the financial
services industry [authors emphasis] and certain
other sectors and professions to identify their
customers and to report suspicious activities
[authors emphasis] when necessary’ (HM
Treasury,17 p. 11).19 Therefore, for the purpose
of this article, the UK’s AML policy can be
divided into three parts – the criminalisation of
money laundering; that regulated financial
institutions are compelled to put in place
systems to preclude and identify money laun-
dering; and the use of reporting identifiable
or suspected money laundering transactions to
the relevant authorities.
The criminalisation of money
laundering
The primary money laundering legislation is
contained in Part 7 of the PCA 2002.20 The Act
applies ‘where money laundering activities took
place on or after 23 February 2003’.21 The
three principal money laundering offences
created by the Act are concealing, disguising,
converting, transferring or removing from the
jurisdiction or criminal property22; entering
into or becoming concerned in an arrange-
ment knowing or suspecting it to facilitate
the acquisition, retention, use and control of
criminal property on behalf of another person23;
and acquiring, using or possessing criminal
property.24 These offences may be committed
by any person, irrespective of the fact they work
within the ‘regulated sector’ or undertake a
‘relevant business’.25 Other offences created by
the Act include failure to disclose by the
regulated sector26; failure to disclose by nomi-
nated officers in the regulated sector27; and
failure to disclose by other nominated officers,28
tipping off,29 and prejudicing an investigation.30
A person commits an offence under s. 327 if
they conceal criminal property, disguise crim-
inal property, convert criminal property, transfer
criminal property or remove criminal property
from England and Wales or from Scotland or
from Northern Ireland.31 All of these offences
apply to property that is criminal property if ‘(a)
it constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal
conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole
or part and whether directly or indirectly), and
(b) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it
constitutes or represents such a benefit’.32 The
scope of this offence is wide and it is possible
for any person to have made a ‘gain’, not just
the person who committed the offence. There
are three important points to note: First, the Act
goes as far as stating that it is of no consequence
‘who carried out the conduct’ or ‘who benefited
from it’ or ‘whether the conduct occurred before
or after the passing of this Act’.33 Second, the
gain must ‘flow from that criminal activity’; this
does not necessarily mean a financial gain and it
could include improvements in someone’s
standards of living or profits derived from the
criminal activity.34 Third, that it ‘represents
such a benefit’ (p. 344).34 A person breaches s.
327 if they know or suspect that it constitutes or
represents such a benefit.35 Section 340(3) of
the PCA offers a definition of criminal property,
which enables the prosecution to argue that the
offender has committed an offence under s.
327. Criminal property is defined as: ‘(a) it
constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal
conduct or it represents such a benefit (in whole
or part and whether directly or indirectly), and
(b) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it
Ryder
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constitutes or represents such a benefit’.36 It is a
defence for a person to make an authorised
disclosure via a suspicious activity report; this
is referred to as an authorised disclosure.37 A
person does not commit an offence if he makes
an authorised disclosure38; he has a reasonable
excuse for not making a disclosure39; and the
action he does is in accordance with under-
taking a function that relates to the enforcement
of a provision under the PCA 2002.40
The second criminal offence provides that a
person commits an offence if they enter or
become concerned in an arrangement that they
know of suspects ‘the acquisition, retention, use
or control of criminal property by or on behalf
of another person’.41 To establish a conviction,
the prosecution must prove that a person
became concerned with an arrangement that
they knew or suspected would make it simpler
for another person to acquire, retain, use or
control criminal property. Furthermore, that
the person concerned also knew or suspected
that the property constituted or represented
benefit from criminal conduct.42 In order for a
person to be guilty of the offence under this
section, the definition of criminal property is
again of central importance. The final offence
provides that a person commits an offence if
they acquire criminal property, use criminal
property or have possession of criminal prop-
erty.43 This offence is not committed if a person
makes an authorised disclosure,44 planned to
make such a disclosure but had a reasonable
excuse for not doing so,45 acquired or used or
had possession of the property for adequate
consideration,46 undertook a function relating
to the enforcement of any provision of the PCA
or other relevant enactment,47 that the conduct
occurs overseas and is lawful in that particular
jurisdiction,48 and that the act is done by a
deposit-taking body.49 In order for a person to
be convicted of an offence, it has to be proven
that the property handled is ‘criminal property’
and that it comprises a benefit. Furthermore, it
has to be proven that the defendant knows or
suspects that the property is obtained from
criminal conduct. It is important to note that
terrorist property is not covered by the PCA
2002, but dealt with the Terrorism Act 2000.50
The laundering of terrorist property is governed
by Part III of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Regulated financial institutions
The second part of the UK’s AML policy is
reliant on the regulations imposed by the FSA,
which has extensive rule-making powers to
impose regulations on the regulated sector.51
Until 2006, the obligations imposed were
contained in Money Laundering Sourcebook
(ML).52 In January 2006, the FSA announced
that it was streamlining ML,52 and it became
obsolete in August 2006. ML was replaced with
a principles-based approach in the Senior
Management Arrangements, Systems and Con-
trols, or SYSC part of the Handbook. Part 3
provides that firms must have in place systems
and controls that are appropriate for the firm to
conduct its business.53 In particular, a firm is
required to ‘take reasonable care to establish and
maintain effective systems and controls for
compliance with applicable requirements and
standards under the regulatory system and for
countering the risk that the firm might be used
to further financial crime’ (SYSC 3.2.6 R).53
Therefore, firms are required to carry out regular
assessments of the adequacy of the AML systems
they have in place to prevent themselves from
being used to further financial crime,54 allocate
a director or senior manager with overall
responsibility for establishing and maintaining
the AML system and to appoint a money
laundering reporting officer.55 The FSA has
extensive investigative and enforcement powers.
For example, it has the ability to require infor-
mation from firms,56 to appoint investigators,57
to obtain the assistance of overseas financial
regulators58 and provide appointed investigators
with additional powers.59 Furthermore, it has
become a prosecuting authority for certain
money laundering offences.60 The FSA also has
the power to impose a financial penalty where it
establishes that there has been a contravention
by an authorised person of its rules.61 The FSA
has imposed a series of fines on firms that have
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breached ML even where there was no evidence
of money laundering.62 More recently, it has
fined a firm’s money laundering reporting
officer.63,64 The FSA also implements the 2007
MLR, the purpose of which is to prevent
businesses based in the United Kingdom from
being abused by criminals and terrorists for the
purposes of money laundering.65
Financial intelligence
The final part is the use of SARs to gather
financial intelligence, which are to be found in
the PCA 2002 and the MLR 2007.66 The PCA
2002 provides that SARs should be submitted if
they ‘suspect’67 or have ‘reasonable grounds for
suspecting’ that an offence has been com-
mitted.68 Brown and Evans concluded that ‘it
is worthy of note that the test to be applied
where the section refers to ‘suspect’ is a subjec-
tive test, whereas where there is reference to
‘reasonable grounds to suspect’, an objective test
should be applied with the result under the
objective test that a defendant’s ‘neglect’ to
properly comply with the obligations in POCA
could result in a criminal conviction’.69 If a firm
has ‘reasonable suspicion’70 or any possibility
provided that it is more than ‘fanciful’ that it is
being used for the purposes of money launder-
ing, it is required to notify its money laundering
reporting officer who will complete an SAR
and send it to SOCA, who will then determine
whether further action is to be taken.71 Wadsley
contended that disclosure is required ‘not just in
clear-cut cases where there is knowledge of
money laundering, but also where there is
merely suspicion’.72 The interpretation of the
term ‘suspicion’ has been contemplated by
courts in England and Wales on many occa-
sions, and is seen by many commentators as
limiting the effectiveness of money laundering
reporting requirements.73 Longmore LJ in R v.
Da Silva took the view that:
It seems to us that the essential element of
the word suspect and its affiliates, in this
context, is that the defendant must think
that there is a possibility, which is more
than fanciful, that the relevant facts
exist. A vague feeling of unease would
not suffice.74
The Court of Appeal added:
The essential element in the word
‘suspect’ and its affiliates, in this context,
is that the defendant must think that there
is a possibility, which is more than
fanciful, that the relevant facts exist. A
vague feeling of unease would not suffice.
But the statute does not require the
suspicion to be ‘clear’ or ‘firmly grounded
and targeted on specific facts’, or based
upon ‘reasonable grounds’.74
According to the Court of Appeal in K v.
National Westminster Bank, HMRC, SOCA,75
the interpretation of ‘suspicion’ is the same in
civil law as it is in criminal law.76 Brown and
Evans took the view that ‘in most cases, the
statement by those making an SAR that they
have a suspicion will be enough. It will be
exceptional for the courts to require those that
report a suspicion to provide justification for
having a suspicion. In reality, it will be for those
challenging the making of a SAR to prove that
no suspicion existed’.77 However, it is impor-
tant to consider the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Shah v. HSBC Private Bank (UK)
Ltd.78 Here, Longmore LJ took the view that
‘I cannot see why, rather than submit to
summary judgment dismissing the claim, Mr
Shah cannot require the bank to prove its case
that it had the relevant suspicion and be entitled
to pursue the case to trial so that the bank
can make good its contention in this respect’
(p. 22).78 As a result of the Court of Appeal’s
decision, Stanton took the view that ‘a simple
assertion that a professional person suspected the
client to be money laundering does not suffice:
evidence needs to be produced to prove the
existence of the suspicion’.79
The overall effectiveness of the SARs regime
has been questioned.80–82 A common criticism
of the reporting requirements is that they have
Ryder
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created a ‘fear factor’ that has resulted in a
significant increase in the number of SARs
submitted.83 The number of SARs submitted
between 1995 and 2002 increased from 5000 to
60 000.84 SOCA reported that it had received
228 834 SARs between October 2008 and
September 2009.85 This represents an increase
of approximately 200 000 reports during a
period of 13 years. The increase is associated
with the threat of sanctions by the FSA, and
it has led to the regulated sector adopting a
tactic that has been referred to as ‘defensive’ or
‘preventative’ reporting.86 The banking sector
has raised concerns about the SAR’s regime,87
and it has been suggested that the requirements
should be abandoned and that the resources
should be redirected elsewhere.
FRAUD
The UK fraud policy can also be divided into
three parts – the criminalisation of fraudulent
activities; regulatory agencies and anti-fraud
reporting requirements. Fraud has been pro-
pelled from its traditional tertiary position,
behind money laundering and terrorist finan-
cing, to the top of the government’s financial
crime agenda. This is due to the publication of
the Fraud Review (the Review) and the
introduction of the Fraud Act 2006.88 Sarker
takes the view that ‘a fresh crop of anti-fraud
initiatives, reviews and legislation has sprung up,
ostensibly demonstrating how fighting fraud is a
top priority in the UK’.89 However, this is not a
view shared by all commentators and it has been
argued that ‘little has changed to reverse the
perception of fraud as a low priority’.89 The
Review was commissioned by the Attorney
General ‘to recommend ways of reducing fraud
and the harm it does to the economy and
society’.90 It considered three questions:
1. What is the level of fraud?
2. What is the appropriate role of the govern-
ment in dealing with fraud?
3. How could government resources be spent
to maximise value for money? (pp. 4-5)90
The Review was unable to accurately outline
the extent of fraud. In relation to its second
task, it concluded that the government has
two functions – to protect public money from
fraudsters and to protect consumers and busi-
nesses against fraud. The Review recom-
mended that the government should adopt a
holistic approach towards fraud and develop a
national strategy. Furthermore, it recommended
the creation of the National Fraud Authority to
develop and implement the strategy. It also
suggested that a National Fraud Reporting
Centre should be created so that businesses and
individuals could report fraud. The NFRC
has been operating since October 2009,91 as
actionfraud.org. The National Fraud Intelli-
gence Bureau is the agency dedicated to analyse
and assess fraud, employing analysts from both
law enforcement and private sector. Fourth, the
Review suggested that a national lead police
should be established based on the City of
London Police Force.92
Criminalisation
Before 2006, the law relating to fraud com-
prised eight statutory deception offences in the
Theft Act (1968 and 1978) and the common
law offence of conspiracy to defraud.93 The
offences created by Theft Act were difficult to
enforce.94 Therefore, it led to the introduction
of the Theft Act 1978, which did little to rectify
the problems.95 The Home Office noted that
it ‘is not always clear which offence should
be charged, and defendants have successfully
argued that the consequences of their particular
deceptive behaviour did not fit the definition of
the offence with which they have been charged’.96
In 1998, the then Home Secretary Jack Straw
MP asked the Law Commission to examine
the law on fraud.97 In 1999, it published a
Consultation Paper that distinguished between
two types of fraudulent offences – dishonesty
and deception.98 The Law Commission con-
cluded that although the concerns expressed
about the existing law were valid they could
be met by extending the existing offences in
preference to creating a single offence of
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fraud.99 The Law Commission published its
final report in 2002 with the Fraud Bill.100 The
Fraud Act came into force on 15 January
2007101; it overhauls and widens the criminal
offences available with respect to fraudulent and
deceptive behaviour.102 The new offence,
punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years
and/or an unlimited fine, can be committed in
three different ways – fraud by false representa-
tion,103 fraud by failing to disclose informa-
tion104 and fraud by abuse of position.105 Dennis
argued that the Act ‘represents the culmination
of a law reform debate that can be traced back
more than 30 years’.106 Scanlan takes the view
that the Fraud Act 2006 ‘provides prosecutors
with a broad range offence of fraud’.107 This
clearly represents a significant improvement on
the statutory offences of the Theft Acts and the
common law offences of conspiracy to defraud.
Regulatory authorities
There are a broad range of regulatory agencies
that attempt to combat fraud.108 The most
prominent agency is the Serious Fraud Office
(SFO), which was established following the ‘era
of financial deregulation’ in 1980s, an era that
resulted in London attracting ‘foreign criminals,
including “mademen” from the US Mafia,
the “Cosa Nostra”, who were now in London
taking advantage of the new climate of enter-
prise, offering securities scams, commodity
futures trading frauds and other forms of
investment rip-offs’.109 Bosworth-Davies noted
that ‘almost overnight, London became the
fraud capital of Europe and every con-man,
snake-oil, salesman, grafter and hustler turned
up’.109 To tackle these problems, the SFO was
created with both investigative and prosecutor-
ial powers.110 The impetus for introducing the
Criminal Justice Act 1987 and creating the
SFO was the Fraud Trials Committee Report,
or ‘Roskill Report’. The Roskill Committee
considered the introduction of more effective
means of fighting fraud through changes to the
law and criminal proceedings.111 The Commit-
tee criticised the staffing levels of the agencies
policing fraud, and that there was a great deal of
overlap between them. Roskill concluded that
‘co-operation between different investigating
bodies in the UK was inefficient, and the inter-
change of information or assistance between
our law enforcement authorities was unsatisfac-
tory’ (p. 8).111 The Roskill Committee made
112 recommendations, of which all but two
were implemented.112 Its main recommen-
dation was the creation of a new unified
organisation responsible for the detection,
investigation and prosecution of serious fraud
cases. The result was the SFO, which has
jurisdiction in England, Wales and Northern
Ireland, but not Scotland.113 It is headed by a
director, who is appointed and accountable to
the Attorney General. Under the Act, the SFO
has the ability to search property and compel
persons to answer questions and produce docu-
ments, provided they have reasonable grounds
to do so.114 The SFO has a budget of £44.6
million per year; it employees 303 staff and has
86 active cases.115
The SFO determines whether or not to
investigate the matter if the allegation meets
the following criteria:
1. Does the value of the alleged fraud exceed
£1 million?
2. Is there an international element to the
fraud?
3. Is it likely to cause widespread public
concern?
4. Does the case require specialised knowl-
edge?
5. Does the SFO need to use its investigative
powers?
The SFO also considers the seriousness of the
case and its complexity, and will investigate
investment fraud, bribery and corruption,
corporate fraud and public sector fraud. The
effectiveness of the SFO has been questioned
following a number of high-profile prosecutions
that have failed. Mahendra describes the
notorious failures of the SFO as reminiscent
of ‘watching the England cricket team – a
victory being so rare and unexpected that it was
Ryder
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a cause of national rejoicing’.116 Indeed, Wright
notes that ‘because the SFO operates in the
spotlight, the beam falls on the unsuccessful as
well as the victorious. Indeed it shines with
blinding brightness on the ones that get
away’.117 The prosecutorial inadequacies of
the SFO were highlighted by the ‘Review of
the Serious Fraud Office’.118 The Review
compared the performance of the SFO with
the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York and the Manhattan
District Attorney’s Office and concluded that
‘the discrepancies in conviction rates are striking’
(pp. 3-4).118 The Review noted that between
2003 and 2007, the SFO’s average conviction
rate was 61 per cent, whereas the conviction
rates in the two aforementioned cases studies
were 91 and 97 per cent, respectively.119 In
September 2007, the Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice announced the creation of the Fraud
Prosecution Unit, now referred to as the Fraud
Prosecution Division,120 which was established
following the collapse of the Jubilee Line fraud
trial.121 The Unit will limit its involvement
to suspected instances of fraud exceeding
£750 000, cases involving the corruption of
public officials, fraud on government depart-
ments, fraud on overseas governments, compli-
cated money laundering cases and any other
matter that it feels is within its remit.121 In
October 2008, HM Crown Prosecution Service
Inspectorate concluded that there ‘has been a
positive direction of travel in terms of successful
outcomes (convictions), which stood at a credi-
table 85 per cent of the defendants proceeded
against in 2007–2008; underlying casework
quality, which is characterised by strong legal
decision-making and active case progression;
and the development of management systems
and leadership profile’.122 Bosworth-Davies
took the view that ‘it [the Serious Fraud Office]
was not the great success that Roskill envisaged,
and its activities were marked out by 20 years of
professional jealousy and internal squabbling
among its component teams’.123 On the con-
trary, the performance of the SFO is hampered
by the complexity of the crimes it investigates.117
Raphael noted that the SFO is ‘always kept
short of resources and instead of being a unified
fraud office, was just another, more sophisti-
cated, prosecution agency’.117
The FSA’s fraud policy can be divided into
four parts – a direct approach,124 increased
supervisory activity,125 promoting a more
joined-up approach126 and Handbook modifi-
cations.127 The FSA requires senior manage-
ment to take responsibility for managing the
risk of fraud and that firms are required to have
in place effective controls and instruments that
are proportionate to the risk the firm faces.128
The FSA encourages firms to maintain their
systems and controls, thematic work, improving
the whistle-blowing arrangement, amending
the financial crime material in the FSA Hand-
book and ensuring that the financial services
sector, trade associations and the government
continue to communicate the risk of fraud
to customers.128 To implement this policy, the
FSA has been given an extensive array of enforce-
ment powers, some of which it has utilised to
combat fraud. It is a prosecuting authority for
both money laundering and certain fraud-related
offences,129 and has the power to impose a
financial penalty where it establishes that there has
been a contravention by an authorised person of
any requirement.61 The FSA fined Capita
Financial Administration Limited £300000 for
poor anti-fraud controls,130 and in May 2007
fined BNP Paribas Private Bank £350000 for
weaknesses in its systems and controls that
allowed a senior employee to fraudulently transfer
£1.4 million out of the firm’s clients’ accounts
without permission.131 Furthermore, it has fined
the Nationwide Building Society £980000 for
‘failing to have effective systems and controls to
manage its information security risks’,132 and
Norwich Union Life, £1.26 million for not
‘having effective systems and controls in place to
protect customers’ confidential information and
manage its financial crime risks’.133 The FSA
also has the power to ban authorised persons
and firms from undertaking any regulated
activity.134 In 2008, the FSA had fined and/or
banned 12 mortgage brokers for submitting
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false mortgage applications. In 2007, the FSA
only imposed five bans were handed down. In
2008, the FSA prohibited 24 separate brokers
and issued fines in excess of £500 000. In the
first half of 2009, the level of fines imposed
by the FSA had already exceeded this figure. In
addition to imposing sanctions on fraudsters,
the FSA has also enabled victims of fraud to
recover losses suffered at the hands of companies
involved in share fraud activity.135
The most recent agency created to tackle
fraud is the NFA.136 The objectives of the NFA
include creating a criminal justice system that is
sympathetic to the needs of victims of fraud by
ensuring that the system operates more effec-
tively and efficiently,137 to discourage organised
criminals from committing fraud in the United
Kingdom and to increase the public’s con-
fidence in the response to fraud. Rider stated
that the NFA
has an impressive list of strategic aims:
tackling the key threats of fraud that pose
the greatest harm to the United Kingdom;
the pursuit of fraudsters effectively, hold-
ing them to account and improving victim
support; the reduction of the UKs ex-
posure to fraud by building, sharing and
acting on knowledge; and securing the
international collaboration necessary to
protect the UK from fraud.138
The NFA’s Interim Chief Executive Sandra
Quinn boldly claimed that ‘we can respond
quickly and effectively to the fraud threat’.136
This level of optimism was not shared by
Bosworth-Davies who stated that the NFA ‘will
last about as long as the unlamented Asset
Recovery Agency’.139 An important measure
introduced by the NFA was the publication of
the National Fraud Strategy, which is an integral
part of the government’s fraud policy,140 under
which the NFA is required to:
1. tackle the threats presented by fraud;
2. act effectively to pursue fraudsters and hold
them to account;
3. improve the support available to victims;
4. reduce the UK’s exposure to fraud by
building the nation’s capability to prevent
it; and
5. target action against fraud more effectively
by building, sharing and acting on knowl-
edge and securing the international colla-
boration necessary to protect the United
Kingdom from fraud.140
Despite the fanfare announcement by the
government that it had created the NFA, one
fundamental question that must be asked is
whether it will actually make any difference
towards the overall effectiveness of the UKs
fraud policy. If we are to believe that the extent
of fraud in the United Kingdom is somewhere
between £14 billion and £30 billion, how is it
possible for an agency to make any valuable
dent in this statistic if it only has a budget of
£29 million over a 3-year period?
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) ‘is chiefly
concerned with the protection of consumers. It
also regulates competition amongst businesses
but this is approached from a consumer
protection perspective’.141 The OFT has three
regulatory objectives – investigation of whether
markets are working well for consumers,
enforcement of competition laws and enforce-
ment of consumer protection laws. It is
important to note that the OFT has its own
fraud policy.142 The objectives of the OFT are
similar to the TFC, in that it seeks to inform
and protect consumers from fraudulent scams.143
Furthermore, the OFT works and cooperates
with other agencies such as the SFO,144 and it
also liaises with overseas agencies.145 Finally,
HM Revenue and Customs deals with issues
such as VAT fraud, alcohol fraud146 and oil
fraud.147
The effectiveness of these anti-fraud agencies
must be questioned. There is a considerable
degree of overlap among the SFO and FSA;
both have extensive investigative and prosecu-
torial powers that seek to achieve the same
objective. The failures of the SFO are well
documented; however, the FSA’s effectiveness
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must be questioned because of its obsession
with combating money laundering. It is recom-
mended that a single financial crime agency
should be established to coordinate the UKs
fraud policy with extensive investigative and
prosecutorial powers. Such an idea was first
mooted by Fisher who recommended the
creation of a ‘single “Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Agency” to tackle serious fraud, corrup-
tion and financial market crimes’.148 This
recommendation has been supported by the
Conservative party that would establish an
Economic Crime Agency that would do the
work of the SFO, the Fraud Prosecution Service
and the OFT. The then Shadow Chancellor
George Osborne MP stated that ‘we are very,
very bad at prosecuting white-collar crime.
We have six different government depart-
ments, eight different agencies and the result is
that these crimes go unpunished’.149 Following
the 2010 general election, the coalition govern-
ment outlined its desire to create a single agency
to tackle financial crime. The government
stated:
we take white collar crime as seriously as
other crime, so we will create a single
agency to take on the work of tackling
serious economic crime that is currently
done by, among others, the Serious Fraud
Office, Financial Services Authority and
Office of Fair Trading.150
However, it is likely that the ‘financial crisis’
could scupper the government’s plans to create
such an agency.151 The Fraud Advisory Panel
writing in March 2010 took the view that
because of the current climate the time is not
right for an economic crime agency.152
Reporting obligations
The Fraud Review noted that ‘fraud is
massively underreported. Fraud is not a police
priority, so even when reports are taken little is
done with them. Many victims therefore, don’t
report at all. So the official crime statistics
display just the tip of the iceberg and developing
a strategic law enforcement response is impos-
sible because the information to target investi-
gations does not exist’.153 If a suspected fraud
is committed against a bank, it is reported to
its Money Laundering Reporting Officer
(MLRO). Successful frauds are reported to
SOCA. On the contrary, it is the decision for
individual banks to determine whether or not
to report the fraud to the police. In 2007, the
Home Office announced that victims of credit
card, cheque and online banking fraud are
to report the matter to banks and financial
institutions.154 However, the obligation to
report allegations of fraud is not as straightfor-
ward, but nonetheless still important. The
primary statutory obligation for reported in-
stances of fraud is contained under the PCA
2002.26 It is a criminal offence under the 2002
Act to fail to disclose via an SAR where there
is knowledge, suspicion or reasonable grounds
to know or suspect, that a person is laundering
the proceeds of criminal conduct. Successful
fraud is defined as money laundering for the
purpose of this Act.155 Furthermore, the Act
specifies that members of the regulated sector
are required to report their suspicions ‘as soon
as reasonable practical’ to SOCA via their
MLRO. There is no legal obligation to report
unsuccessful or attempted frauds to the autho-
rities because any attempted frauds will not give
rise to any legal criminal proceedings that are
available for money laundering, and fall outside
the scope of the mandatory reporting obliga-
tions under the PCA 2002. Ultimately, the
decision lies with the police about whether or
not an investigation will be conducted. The
Home Office has advised that the police should
only investigate where there are good grounds
that they believe a criminal offence has been
committed.156
Furthermore, members of the regulated
sector are obliged to report fraud to the FSA
in the following circumstances:
1. it becomes aware that an employee may
have committed a fraud against one of its
customers; or
The fight against illicit finance
261& 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1745-6452 Journal of Banking Regulation Vol. 12, 3, 252–275
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
2. it becomes aware that a person, whether or
not employed by it, may have committed a
fraud against it; or
3. it considers that any person, whether or not
employed by it, is acting with intent to
commit a fraud against it; or
4. it identifies irregularities in its accounting or
other records, whether or not there is
evidence of fraud; or
5. it suspects that one of its employees may be
guilty of serious misconduct concerning his
honesty or integrity and which is connected
with the firm’s regulated activities or
ancillary activities.157
In determining whether or not the matter is
significant, the firm must consider:
1. the size of any monetary loss or potential
monetary loss to itself or its customers
(either in terms of a single incident or group
of similar or related incidents);
2. the risk of reputational loss to the firm; and
3. whether the incident or a pattern of
incidents reflects weaknesses in the firm’s
internal controls (SUP 15.3.18G).157
The FSA Handbook also provides that the
FSA ‘the notifications under SUP 15.3.17 R are
required as the FSA needs to be aware of the
types of fraudulent and irregular activity which
are being attempted or undertaken, and to act,
if necessary, to prevent effects on consumers or
other firms’.158 Therefore, ‘a notification under
SUP 15.7.3 G should provide all relevant and
significant details of the incident or suspected
incident of which the firm is aware’.158 Further-
more, ‘if the firm may have suffered significant
financial losses as a result of the incident, or may
suffer reputational loss, and the FSAwill wish to
consider this and whether the incident suggests
weaknesses in the firm’s internal controls’.159 If
the institution has suffered a significant financial
loss, or may suffer reputational loss as a result of
the fraudulent activity, the FSA will take into
account whether the incident suggests weak-
nesses in the institution’s internal controls. If the
fraud is committed by representatives and other
Approved Persons, the FSA has the power to
withdraw its authorisation and the possibility of
prosecution.
The UKs policy towards fraud has gained
momentum under the previous government, a
willingness shared by the new coalition admin-
istration. However, there is still scope for
improvement in the initiatives that have been
introduced to tackle fraud. For example, the
effectiveness of the criminalisation of fraud has
been limited by the inadequacies of the Theft
Acts and the common law offences, a position
that has improved by the introduction of the
Fraud Act. However, concerns still remain
about the enforcement of these offences by
the SFO and the CPS following the collapse of
several high-profile instances of fraud. It is
simply too early to determine whether the
Fraud Act has made any difference to the
prosecution of fraudsters. The coalition govern-
ment must be commended for recognising the
need to create single economic crime agency.
The reporting of instances of suspicious frau-
dulent activities is fragmented with a number of
different reporting mechanisms available. This
causes confusion and delay.
TERRORIST FINANCING
In 2002, HM Treasury published a report that
outlined the important contribution made by
the government towards targeting the sources of
terrorist financing.160 In 2007, the government
launched ‘The financial challenge to crime and
terrorism’, which ‘sets out for the first time
how the public and private sector would come
together to deter terrorists from using the
financial system, detect them when they did,
and use financial tools to disrupt them’.13 In
2010, HM Treasury stated that ‘the govern-
ment’s aim is to deprive terrorists and violent
extremists of the financial resources and systems
needed for terrorist-related activity, including
radicalisation’ (p. 5).160 What can be deduced
from these policy documents is that the UK’s
terrorist financing policy can be divided into
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three parts – the criminalisation of terrorist
financing, the freezing of terrorist assets and the
use of SARs.
Criminalisation of terrorist
financing
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989 criminalised terrorist
financing and allowed the government to seek
the forfeiture of any money or other property
that, at the time of the offence, he had in his
possession or under his control.161 The United
Kingdom has achieved some success in Northern
Ireland against the Irish Republican Army by
virtue of offences created by this Act.162
However, the effectiveness of the Act was
questioned and it resulted in a review of the
UK’s terrorist policy.50 The consultation paper
concluded that the terrorist financing provisions
contained several weaknesses including the fact
that there were only four terrorist financing
convictions between 1978 and 1989 (paragraph
6.14).162 Bell argues that ‘there have been no
successful prosecutions for terrorist funding
offences in Northern Ireland over the last 30
years and the forfeiture provisions under the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provi-
sions) Act 1989 have never been utilised’.163
The Home Office recommended that the scope
of the terrorist financing provisions should
be extended to fund-raising for all terrorist
purposes.164 The provisions were amended by
the Terrorism Act 2000, which created five
offences. Section 15 makes it a criminal offence
for a person to solicit,165 or to receive,166 or
provide money or property on behalf of
terrorists if the person knows or has reasonable
cause to suspect that such money may be used
for the purpose of terrorism.167 By virtue of
Section 16, a person commits an offence if he
uses money or other property for terrorist
purposes.168 Furthermore, the person commits
an offence if he possesses money or other
property and he intends that it should be used,
or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will
be used, for the purposes of terrorism.169
Section 17 states that a person commits an
offence if he enters into or becomes concerned
in an arrangement in which money170 or
property is made available to another and the
person knows or has cause to suspect that it
may be used for terrorism.171 A person breaches
Section 18 if he enters into or becomes con-
cerned in an arrangement that facilitates the
retention or control by or on behalf of another
person of terrorist property by concealment,172
by removal from the jurisdiction,173 by transfer
to nominees174 or in any other way.175 It is a
defence for a person charged under Section 19
to prove that they either did not know, or had
reasonable cause to suspect that the arrangement
was associated to terrorist property.176 The
Terrorism Act 2000 has had a limited impact.
Bell noted that ‘the primary difficulty for the
prosecution in terrorist finance cases, however,
is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
property is terrorist property’.177
Between 2001 and 2008, a total of 34 people
have been charged with the fund-raising
offences under Sections 15–19 of the Terrorism
Act 2000.178 Yet only a total of 10 people have
been convicted of fund-raising offences under
the 2000 Act during the same time period
(Home Office178, p. 73).179 However, Lord
Carlile did note that ‘there are some charges
pending, and statistics to appear during 2009 are
likely to demonstrate a high degree of vigilance
by the authorities against the possession,
potential transfer and use of terrorist funds’.180
Bell realistically concluded ‘a strategy against
terrorist funding, this option is the most difficult
from an investigative and prosecutorial perspec-
tive. Experience suggests, therefore, that only
rarely will it be possible to prove terrorist
finance charges, for example, where an exact
tracing exercise has been carried out showing a
financial trail between money in a particular
account and arms purchases on behalf of a
terrorist organisation’.177
The Terrorism Act 2000 grants law enforce-
ment agencies additional investigative powers
including financial information and account
monitoring orders.181 These have been descri-
bed as ‘an essential part of the legislation’.182
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The purpose of an account monitoring order is
to permit law enforcement agencies to discover
and recognise relevant bank accounts while
undertaking a terrorist investigation. In order to
obtain an account monitoring order, an appli-
cation must be made by a police officer, at least
at the rank of superintendent,183 before a circuit
judge,184 who must be satisfied that ‘(a) the
order is sought for the purposes of a terrorist
investigation, (b) the tracing of terrorist pro-
perty is desirable for the purposes of the
investigation, and (c) the order will enhance
the effectiveness of the investigation’.185 Once
an order has been granted, it will enable
the police to require a financial institution y
to provide customer information for the
purposes of the investigation’.186 Schedule 6
defines ‘customer information’ as including
information about whether or not a business
relationship exists or existed between a financial
institution and a customer, the customer’s
account details, name, address and date of
birth.187 Peddie, citing Lord Carlile’s 2005
report on the performance of the Terrorism
Act 2000, stated ‘Lord Carlile opined that the
financial information order system worked well
and that there was a good level of co-operation
between the police and financial institutions’.188
The Terrorism Act 2000 states that if a person
is convicted of an offence under Part III,189
any property connected with the offence
could be the subject of a forfeiture order.190
This is referred to as criminal forfeiture.191 The
person subject to the order, once granted by a
court, is required to give to a police officer
as designated any property specified in the
order.192 The Terrorism Act 2000 also allows
for Orders in Council to be made to permit
foreign forfeiture orders to be recognised in
England.193
The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001 amended the provisions for account
monitoring orders, financial information orders
and disclosure information orders. Under the
2001 Act, an account monitoring order may be
granted by a Crown Court Judge provided that
the court is satisfied that the order is sought
for the purposes of a terrorist investigation, the
tracing of terrorist property is desirable for the
purposes of the investigation, and the order will
enhance the effectiveness of the investigation.194
Billings took the view that ‘the effect of an
account monitoring order is that the financial
institution served with it must provide informa-
tion of the description specified, for the period
of the order and in accordance with it as to the
time and place of the provision of infor-
mation’.195 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 states that a court can grant
a Financial Information Order that compels a
financial institution to disclose certain types of
customer information for a terrorist investiga-
tion. A disclosure of information order allows
for the disclosure of certain types of informa-
tion and are very wide ranging. For example,
they apply to any of the provisions listed in
Schedule 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001.
Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism Act
(2008) contained a number of provisions that
the Government state are designed to enhance
counter-terrorism powers. Under the Act, HM
Treasury gained additional powers to direct
financial institutions to carry out a graduated
range of financial restrictions on business
connected with jurisdictions of concern regard-
ing money laundering and terrorist finan-
cing.196 Part 1 of Schedule 7 outlines the
conditions for giving a direction. HM Treasury
liaises with the FATF who can dictate when
appropriate action needs to be taken about a
particular country because of the inherent risks
of money laundering or terrorist financing.197
These powers were used in 2008 after the FATF
stated that it ‘remains particularly concerned
about Iran’s failure to address the risk of terrorist
financing and the serious threat this poses
to the integrity of the international financial
system’.198 In response, HM Treasury issued a
notice based on the advice of the FATF.199 In
addition, if HM Treasury is of the opinion that a
country poses a considerable threat to the UK’s
national interests because of an increased threat
of money laundering of terrorist financing,
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it is permitted to issue a direction. Part 2 of
the Schedule outlines the persons to whom
a direction may be given. This includes, for
example, people operating within the financial
services sector.200 The third part of Schedule 7
outlines the requirements that can be imposed
by a direction. This includes, for example,
imposing certain conditions on financial trans-
actions or business relationships. The direction
could also require an improved level of due
diligence and that new transaction should not
be entered into. Part 6 of Schedule 7 provides
for the use of civil sanctions by the relevant
enforcement authority. A civil sanction can be
imposed if a person fails to comply with
the obligation imposed by the direction. The
Schedule 7 powers were used by HM Treasury
in 2009 when it issued ‘Direction to the UK
financial sector to cease all business relationships
and transactions with Bank Mellat and Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines’.201 Goldby
notes that ‘the Order was made on the basis’
that ‘the Treasury believe that activity in Iran
that facilitates the development or production
of nuclear weapons poses a significant risk to the
national interests of the United Kingdom’.201
The Order was imposed because of the
perceived increased threat posed by Iran.201
The Order provides that the financial sector
cease any business relationships with Bank
Mellat and IRISL. This means that Bank Mellat
are not allowed to conduct any financial trans-
actions in the United Kingdom.202 In 2009,
Bank Mellat have challenged the direction by
HM Treasury.203
Asset freezing
The Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act
2001 authorises the seizure of terrorist cash
anywhere in the United Kingdom,204 the
freezing of funds at the start of an investigation,205
the monitoring of suspected accounts,206 the
imposition of requirements on people working
within financial institutions to report where
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that
funds are destined for terrorism and to permit
HM Treasury to freeze assets of foreign
individuals and groups. Part II of the Act
permits HM Treasury to freeze the assets of
overseas governments or residents who have
taken, or are likely to take, action to the
detriment of the UK’s economy or action
constituting a threat to the life or property of a
national or resident of the United Kingdom.207
HM Treasury is allowed to make a freezing
order if two statutory requirements are met.
First, they must reasonably believe that action
threatening the UK’s economy or the life or
property of UK nationals or residents has taken
place or is likely to take place.208 Second, the
persons involved in the action must be resident
outside the United Kingdom or be an overseas
government.209 The freezing order prevents all
persons in the United Kingdom from making
funds available to, or for the benefit of, a person
or persons specified in the order.210 HM
Treasury is also required to keep the freezing
order under review and to determine whether
it should continually be enforced over a period
of 2 years.211 HM Treasury has frozen the assets
of individuals and organisations that were sus-
pected of financing terrorism.212 The govern-
ment regularly updates a list of organisations and
individuals whose accounts have been frozen.213
Before 2001, HM Treasury froze £90 million
of terrorist assets, which is attributed towards
the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002.214
After this initial success, HM Treasury has only
been able to freeze a further £10 million.215 It
has been suggested that this success can be
measured in the actual amount of money frozen
‘and though the headline figure thus generated
is doubtless politically satisfying to some, it is
not a measure of effectiveness’.216 In July 2009,
Lord Myners reported that ‘as of the end of
June 2009, a total of 237 accounts containing
£607 661 of suspected terrorist funds were
frozen in the UK’.217 In October 2007, HM
Treasury’s Asset Freezing Unit was created.
Until this date, the Bank of England had its own
Financial Sanctions Unit, and this was trans-
ferred under the ambit of HM Treasury. The
Asset Freezing Unit is responsible for legislation
on financial sanctions, the implementation and
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administration of domestic financial sanctions;
the designation of terrorist organisations, the
implementation and administration of inter-
national financial sanctions in the United
Kingdom, liaising with the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office and collaborating with
international partners to develop the interna-
tional frameworks for asset freezing. The FATF
concluded that ‘the UK has established a terrorist
asset freezing regime which works well in
practice. It has an effective domestic designation
process which appears rapid, easy and efficient.
The system can operate independently of the
UN and EU listing mechanisms, where neces-
sary’.218 Therefore, the United Kingdom was
fully compliant with the international standards
and this resulted in the government stating that
the United Kingdom was ‘the first country to
be awarded the fully compliant rating’ in
relation to asset freezing.219
The United Kingdom has implemented
the Terrorism (United Nations Measures)
Order to give legal effect to Security Council
Resolution 1373.220 The Order also gives effect
for the enforcement of EC Regulation 2580/
2001, which permits for the designation of
people within this regulation for such measures
that relate to, inter alia, the freezing of funds,
financial assets and economic resources.221
HM Treasury took the view that the aim of
the Order ‘was enhanced to provide further
restrictions on making funds, economic resources
and financial services available to anyone who
has been designated in the UK by the Treasury
as a person suspected of committing, attempting
to commit, participating in or facilitating acts of
terrorism’.222 By virtue of Article 4 of the
Order, HM Treasury has been given the power
to designate a person if four conditions are met.
HM Treasury has reasonable grounds to suspect
that a person is or may be (a) a person who
commits, attempts to commit, participates in or
facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism;
(b) a person named in the Council Decision;
(c) a person owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by a designated person; or (d) a
person acting on behalf of or at the direction of
a designated person. Under Article 5 of the
Order, HM Treasury is required to undertake
appropriate measures to publicise the direction
or to notify specific people and to inform the
person identified in the direction. Furthermore,
under Article 7 of the 2006 Order, a person is
prohibited from ‘dealing with funds, financial
assets and economic resources of anyone who
commits, attempts to commit, participates in or
facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism;
designated persons; anyone owned or controlled
by them or anyone acting on their behalf of
or at their direction’. The article makes it a
criminal offence to contravene this prohibition.
Article 8 of the Order prohibits making funds,
financial assets, economic resources or financial
services available to anyone in respect of whom
Article 7 applies. The article makes it a criminal
offence to contravene this prohibition.
The legality of the Terrorism (United
Nations Measures) Order 2006 was challenged
in A v. HM Treasury.223 Here, the appellants
required orders from the court to quash the
freezing of their assets under the 2006 Terror-
ism (United Nations) Order.224 Collins J
decided that the orders granted should be set
aside against five applicants on three grounds.
First, that parliamentary approval should have
been sought and that they should not have been
made by Order in Council. Second, the court
decided that it was impossible to determine
how the test adopted by HM Treasury, that it
had reasonable grounds for suspecting the
applicants was of could be committing terrorists
acts, could represent a necessary means of
applying the relevant United Nations Resolu-
tion. Third, that the 2006 Order created
criminal offences that contravened the principle
of legal certainty. The interpretation of the
phrase ‘economic resources’ was crucial, and
the court decided that the definition of this
phrase meant that the family members of the
applicants did not know whether they were
breaching the Order or whether they needed
a licence from HM Treasury.225 HM Treasury
petitioned the Court of Appeal,226 who con-
sidered four issues. First, was the 2006 Terrorism
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Order unlawful and should it be quashed?
Second, what was impact of the lack of
procedural safeguards in the 2006 Order? Third,
whether the offences created under Articles 7
and 8 of the Order satisfied the principles of
legal certainty and proportionality? Finally,
whether the Al-Qaeda and Taliban (United
Nations Measures) 2006 was unlawful because a
person placed on the United Nations Sanctions
Committee list has no appeal mechanism
against that decision. The Court of Appeal held
that the reasonable ground test adopted by HM
Treasury did not go beyond the ambit of
Resolution 1373, but the requirement in the
2006 Order of ‘or may be’ did go further than
the Resolution. Therefore, it determined that
the directions granted by HM Treasury were
quashed. Second, the Court of Appeal stated
that the courts must be relied on to guarantee
that satisfactory procedural protection is upheld
for applicants under the Order.227 Third, the
provisions of the licensing system under the
Order were proportionate and legally certain.
Finally, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban (United
Nations Measures) 2006 was lawful.
In response, the government has introduced
the Terrorism (United Nations Measures)
Order,228 which provides that a direction will
cease to have effect 12 months after it is made,
but HM Treasury has the ability to renew a
direction.229 The Order revises the prohibition
on making funds, economic resources and
financial services available for the benefit of a
designation person so that they only apply if the
designated person obtains, or is able to obtain, a
significant financial benefit. Furthermore, the
ban on making funds, economic resources
and financial available directly to a designated
person, as outlined above, are unaltered.
Furthermore, the 2009 Order changes the
prohibition on making economic resources
available to a designated person by providing a
defence to that person if they did not know and
had no reasonable cause to suspect that econo-
mic resources that they provided to a designated
person would be likely to be exchanged or used
in exchange for funds, goods or services. The
Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury,
Lord Myners, took the view that ‘overall, these
changes will improve the operation of the asset-
freezing regime, ensure that it remains fair and
proportionate and help facilitate effective com-
pliance by ensuring that prohibitions are more
tailored and clearer in how they apply’.217 The
matter finally came before the Supreme Court
who also considered the legitimacy of the
Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order
and the Al-Qaeda and Taliban (United Nations
Measures) Order 2006. The Supreme Court
determined that both of the Orders were ultra
vires and HM Treasury swiftly responded by
publishing the Draft Terrorist Asset Freezing
Bill (2010) and implementing the Terrorist
Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act
2010. Johnston and Nanopoulos took the view
that the Act ‘deems all of the impugned Orders
in Council under the 1946 Act to have been
validly adopted and thus retains in force all
directions made under those Orders; the Act
will expire on 31 December 2010’.230
Reporting requirements
Schedule 2 Part III to the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 inserted s. 21A
into the Terrorism Act 2000 and created the
offence of failure to disclose for the regulated
sector. A person commits an offence under this
section if three conditions are met. The first
condition is that the accused knows or suspects,
or has reasonable grounds for knowing or
suspecting that a person has committed an
offence under Sections 15–18 of the Terrorism
Act 2000.231 The second condition is that the
information or other matter upon which the
accused has based his knowledge or suspicion,
or which gives reasonable grounds for such
knowledge of suspicion, came to him in the
course of a business that operates within the
regulated sector.232 The third condition is that
the accused does not disclose the information
or other matter to a constable or nominated
officer, normally a money laundering reporting
officer as soon as practicable after he received
the information.233 Lord Carlile took the view
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that these reporting obligations are ‘still under-
publicised duty, to which the only major
statutory exception is genuine legal professional
privilege’.182 Since the introduction of the new
section 21A, there have been no trials in which
this new section have been tested (p. 18).233
First, that the defendant knows or suspects, or
has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspect-
ing that another person has committed an
offence under Sections 15–18 of the Terrorism
Act 2000.234 The second condition is that the
information or other matter on which his
knowledge or suspicion is based, or which gives
reasonable grounds for such knowledge or sus-
picion, came to him in the course of a business
in the regulated sector.234 The final condition is
that he does not disclose the information or
other matter to a constable or a nominated
officer as soon as is practicable after it comes to
him.235 A person does not commit an offence if
they had a reasonable excuse for not disclosing
the information or other matter or he is a
professional legal adviser and the information
or other matter came to him in privileged
circumstances.235 Lord Carlile took the view
that ‘this is a wide and still under-publicised
duty, to which the only major statutory
exception is genuine legal professional pri-
vilege’.236 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 amended the Terrorism Act
2000 and inserted a defence of protected
disclosures.237 In order for this defence to be
utilised, three conditions must be met. The first
condition is that the information or other
matter disclosed came to the person making
the disclosure (the discloser) in the course of a
business in the regulated sector.238 The second
condition is that the information or other
matter causes the discloser to know or suspect,
or gives him reasonable grounds for knowing or
suspecting that a person has committed an
offence as outlined above under Sections 15–18
of the Terrorism Act 2000.239 The third and
final condition is that the disclosure is made to a
constable or a nominated officer as soon as is
practicable after the information or other matter
comes to the discloser.240 A new S. 21ZA was
inserted into the Terrorism Act in December
2007.241 This amendment allows people to
undertake unlawful acts provided there is consent
by an authorised officer and its aim is to facilitate
the discovery of offences. The amendments also
aim to protect disclosures after disclosures are
made after entering into such arrangements.
Section 21ZC also provides a defence of
reasonable excuse for not disclosing. An indivi-
dual or organisation who suspects that an offence
has been committed under the Terrorism Act
2000 required to complete an SAR, which is
then sent to SOCA for processing. Lord Carlile,
in his annual report on the operation of the TA
2000, commented that ‘there are concerns in the
business sector about difficulties of compliance
and the serious consequences that may flow from
this’.242 In 2005, the Lander Review noted that
‘in 2005, just under 2100 of the total SARs
(1 per cent) were judged by the FIU terrorism
team to be of potential interest in a terrorist
context, of which about 650 were passed on to
the NTFIU for more detailed investigation.
There was a slight peak of reports of interest
following the events of 7 and 21 July 2005’.243
The number of terrorist-related SARs submitted
between 2007 and 2008 was 956,244 whereas the
number between 2008 and 2009 was 703.245
The usefulness of SARs in relation to terrorist
financing was highlighted by SOCA who took
the view that ‘although the numbers continue to
be small in proportion to the total numbers of
SARs, their value can be significant, as has been
demonstrated in previous years in which major
terrorist incidents have taken place. All UK
counter-terrorism investigations have a financial
aspect to them, and the UKFIU Terrorist
Finance Team has continued to provide support
to these over the year’ (p. 17).245
CONCLUSIONS
Money laundering
The United Kingdom has fully complied with
its international obligations under the Vienna
and Palermo Conventions and its requirements
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under the Money Laundering Directives. In
fact, the UK’s measures go beyond its inter-
national obligations. The criminalisation of
money laundering occurred in 1986, since
when the legislative frameworks have been
updated and codified by the PCA 2002. The
involvement of the FSA is an innovative attempt
to reduce the impact of money laundering. It is
the first time that a financial regulatory body in
the United Kingdom has been given such a
specific role, a position that can be contrasted
with the United States. The FSA has imple-
mented a costly and at times unnecessarily
complicated regime, yet they have at least
attempted to lessen the AML obligations by
implementing SYSC. The scheme introduced
by the FSA will, in the main, do little to
discourage well-organised criminals from laun-
dering money in the United Kingdom. The
SARs reporting requirements have imposed
significant administrative burdens on financial
institutions. They have led to an increased level
of record-keeping, report filing and internal
policing requirements. The imposition of even
more mandatory reporting requirements was
inevitable given the government’s tough stance
towards money laundering. It is questionable,
however, whether the filing of an SAR will
make any difference given the difficulties in
securing prosecutions in money laundering
offences. It is also possible to argue that the
reporting requirements have created a ‘needle-
in-the-haystack’ problem, especially given the
large number of SARs annually submitted. In its
2004 policy document, HM Treasury referred
to 2003 IMF review of the UK’s AML
legislative framework and policy. The review
concluded that ‘the UK has a comprehensive
legal, institutional and supervisory regime for
AML’.17 However, the UK’s AML approach
can be criticised because of its ambit and burden
imposed on the sectors that are forced to
comply with it.246 Maylam noted that despite
the best efforts of the United Kingdom, the fight
against money laundering ‘can only be effective
if conducted on a global basis with a spirit of
co-operation and legal compatibility’.247
Fraud
The UK fraud policy has gathered pace
following the publication of the Fraud Review
in 2006, but is still in a state of flux. The policy
adopted is very similar to that adopted in the
United States, but the criminalisation of fraud
can be contrasted with the approach in the
United States. The United Kingdom has a
single Fraud Act, which criminalises different
types of fraudulent activities and provides
prosecutors with new powers to tackle fraud.
The second part of its anti-fraud policy
concerns primary and secondary agencies, and
it is this part that is need of fundamental reform.
There is no single agency that takes a lead role
in tackling fraud; there are simply too many
agencies who performing the same function, a
position that has deteriorated by the fact that
not one government department performs a
similar function to the Department of Justice.
For example, HM Treasury has been charged
with developing and implementing the UK’s
policies towards money laundering and terrorist
financing, yet it has very little to do with the
UK’s fraud policy. Furthermore, the Home
Office, who has been charged with tackling the
problems associated with organised crime, does
little to tackle fraud. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that a single government department
be given the task of tackling all types of financial
crime, it seems logical that this task is given to
HM Treasury, given its experience with money
laundering and terrorist financing. Another
example of the overlap between anti-fraud
agencies relates to the fact that both the SFO
and FSA have the ability to conduct investiga-
tions and initiate prosecutions. The NFA has
been given a 3-year budget of £29 million to
tackle an industry that is worth £30 billion.
Therefore, it faces an improbable mission to
reduce the extent of fraud with a very small
budget. This makes little or no sense. The UK
government should develop unitary financial
crime agency that incorporates the functions of
the agencies outlined above. It is possible to
argue that this process has already started with
the merger of several agencies including the
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National Crime Squad, the National Criminal
Intelligence Service and the Assets Recovery
Agency into SOCA. The final part of the UK’s
policy can be contrasted with that of the United
States. The primary legislation that imposes
reporting obligations is the PCA 2002, under
which fraud is reported to SOCA. However, in
some circumstances allegations of fraud are
reported to banks, the police and the regulated
sector reports to the FSA. The system needs
clarification and it has not been assisted by the
creation of the NFRC. In the United States,
allegations of fraud are reported to FinCEN,
and it is suggested that the United Kingdom
should adopt a similar reporting strategy, and
that all suspicious transactions relating to fraud
should be reported to SOCA.
The United Kingdom has had specific
anti-terrorist financial legislation in place since
1989 and it has learnt a number of important
lessons from the terrorist campaign conducted
by the Irish Republican Army and other para-
military organisations. The government has
fully implemented UN Resolutions and it must
be commended for going beyond the scope
of its international obligations. The United
Kingdom has adopted a similar approach
towards the prevention of terrorist finance as
that utilised by the United States. The Terror-
ism Act 2000 overhauled the terrorist financing
offences that yielded a derisory four convictions
over a 10-year period. This could be explained
by the sheer number of sources of financing
available to terrorist organisations. The ability
to freeze the assets of suspected terrorist
organisations has been available since 1964, yet
it was not until the fall of the Taliban that HM
Treasury froze assets over £80 million. The
ability of the government to freeze the assets of
terrorist organisations initially appeared to be an
effective weapon against terrorist finance. Sub-
sequently, HM Treasury has only frozen a
further £10 million of suspected terrorist assets.
However, the ability to freeze the assets of
suspected terrorists has been limited to the
decision in A v. HM Treasury. Therefore, this
part of the policy must be criticised because,
like the US stance, it is a short-term solution to
a long-term problem. The effectiveness of the
reporting requirements under the Terrorism
Act 2000 and the Anti-terrorism Crime and
Security Act 2001 must also be queried, owing
to the extensive sources of funding options
available to terrorists.
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